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The purchase of generic drugs has been increasingly encouraged by Governments, as a
way of reducing health costs. However, their acceptance by consumers is not that straightfor-
ward and it has been seen some resistance associated with lack of information and some other
factors, including loyalty to previously used branded products. Thus, this dissertation aims to
study the consumers’ preferences over generic drugs, by clarifying some of these speculations
while trying to check whether the data confirms these reasonings.
This was possible by exploring a rich database from the Portuguese National Association
of Pharmacies, which includes very detailed information of each medicine sales at pharmacies
in Portugal.
The results show that when introducing one more equivalent generic medicine in a group,
the individual share of each drug decreases, although the generic ones suffer a higher decrease
in their shares. Additionally, generic drugs tend to have a lower individual share than the equiv-
alent branded medicines.
Afterwards, over a short time, even on year-on-year comparisons, the shares of generic
drugs tend to increase, opposed to the shares of branded products, which indicates a relatively
fast change in preferences, based on the speed of information spreading and reputation building.
Although in the analyzed sample people buy more generic than non-generic drugs, it is
shown that if one more generic medicine and the correspondent proportion of branded drugs is
introduced such that the proportion of equivalent generic drugs remains unchanged, the branded
products will immediately capture a higher market share.
Keywords: consumers’ preferences; generic drugs; drugs market.
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A compra de medicamentos genéricos tem vindo a ser encorajada pelos Governos, como
forma de reduzir os custos da saúde. No entanto, a sua aceitação por parte dos consumidores
não é fácil, havendo alguma resistência associada à falta de informação, mas também a outros
fatores, como a fidelidade a medicamentos de marca anteriormente utilizados. Assim, esta dis-
sertação tem como objetivo estudar as preferências dos consumidores relativamente a medica-
mentos genéricos, tentando clarificar algumas destas especulações e verificar se os dados as
confirmam.
Para isso, explorou-se uma base de dados fornecida pela Associação Nacional de Far-
mácias, que inclui informações detalhadas das vendas dos medicamentos nas farmácias em
Portugal.
Os resultados mostram que ao introduzir mais um genérico equivalente no seu grupo, a
quota de cada medicamento individual diminui, apesar de serem os medicamentos genéricos a
sofrer uma maior redução. Adicionalmente, medicamentos genéricos tendem a ter uma quota
individual menor do que os medicamentos de marca equivalentes.
Seguidamente e ao longo do tempo, numa comparação homóloga, as quotas dos medica-
mentos genéricos tendem a crescer contrariamente aos não-genéricos, o que indica uma alter-
ação relativamente rápida nas preferências, com base na divulgação de informação e crescente
reputação.
Apesar de se observar que são vendidos mais genéricos do que não-genéricos na amostra
utilizada, verificou-se que se introduzirmos simultaneamente um medicamento genérico e a
respetiva proporção de medicamentos de marca de forma a que a proporção de medicamentos
genéricos equivalentes não se altere, os de marca irão capturar imediatamente uma maior quota.
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The drugs market has been suffering many changes during the last decades. Not only because
new medicines and therapies have been discovered, contributing to the increase in the number
of treatments available, but also because when the patents of the original drugs expire, progres-
sively new equivalent drugs have been introduced in the market.
In this thesis we will explore how the market shares of equivalent medicines change when
more generic drugs are introduced, by using data on the way consumers made choices when con-
fronted with the option of buying a generic or a branded medicine. Firstly, this study considers
the individual drug shares into their homogeneous groups, which allows to test if each generic
drug has higher shares than branded products as well as consumers’ tendency to diversify be-
tween equivalent medicines that may be related to some socioeconomic factors. Additionally,
the aggregated shares of all the equivalent generic drugs are also taken into consideration, in
order to be possible to study preferences for generic drugs as a whole which, once more, may
depend on some socioeconomic factors, too. Nevertheless, opposed to Aronsson et al. (2001),
the market shares will be computed using quantities, specifically the number of units purchased,
instead of the market shares in terms of money spent.
In order to do this, a database provided by the Portuguese National Association of Phar-
macies (Associação Nacional de Farmácias - ANF) is going to be used, which includes detailed
information of the drugs sales in volume and in value, in each Portuguese county between the
years 2013 and 2017. Some characteristics of the drugs are also part of the database, such as if
each drug is a generic or a branded product, if a medical prescription is needed to buy them, their
reimbursement percentage from government or their classification about the organ or system of
organs over which they act. It is expected that consumers’ preferences are mainly influenced by
price differences and availability of equivalent drugs but also by some socioeconomic factors.
However, the effects of these factors is not easily predicted since, for instance, higher levels of
education may lead to more generic acceptance whereas higher income may lead to a preference
for a branded product previously used and these two variables correlate and it is not possible to
identify ex ante which one will dominate.
By crossing it with a group of socioeconomic variables collected in order to characterize
each county, it will be possible to have a perception of the socioeconomic conditions that may
influence consumers’ preferences, apart from price differences and availability of equivalent
drugs.
After that, two main econometric regressions will be performed to understand how the
individual shares of the individual drugs, either generic or brand-name ones, are affected by the
introduction of new equivalent generic drugs as well as by consumers’ socioeconomic back-
ground. Additionally, this study tries to find if Portuguese patients prefer generic drugs to
non-generic ones, taking into consideration price differences and again their socioeconomic
characteristics. Since the government has been introducing new policies to incentivize the con-
1
sumption of generic drugs, it will also be possible to test if these have been effective.
It was possible to conclude that individual generic drugs have lower shares than the equiv-
alent branded ones. Moreover, when generic drugs are introduced, the individual share of other
equivalent medicines decreases, although the generic medicines are the ones who lose more.
Regarding the preferences for generic medicines as a whole, it was possible to verify that the
municipalities with more unemployed people are the ones where more generic drugs are sold
but, on the other hand, there seems not to be significant differences in terms of the preferences
for generic drugs between young and old patients. Furthermore, the higher the price differ-
ences between generic and non-generic drugs, the higher the preferences in favor of the first
ones. Finally, it was concluded that if one new generic drug is introduced simultaneously with
the introduction of the respective proportion of equivalent non-generic drugs, maintaining the
proportion of equivalent generic drugs available, the branded products capture immediately a
higher share.
Consumers choose the goods they want to buy not only according to price but also taking
into consideration the quality of the product as well as some of its characteristics and attributes.
(Asker and Cantillon, 2010; Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009). Furthermore, sometimes it is
not just the characteristics and price of one product itself that matters for the consumer choice,
since they also consider how a good compares with other similar ones (Bordalo, Gennaioli and
Schleifer, 2013).
In fact, changes in the households’ consumption bundles are frequent and can be seen
during recessions and financial crises (Nevo and Wong, 2019; McKenzie and Schargrodsky,
2011) as well as in the different phases of the business cycle (Jaimovich, Rebelo and Wong,
2019). Moreover, when new similar products are introduced in a market there may be an incen-
tive to adjust the consumption bundle, which may happen to be different from one household to
another due to the existence of some idiosyncratic factors.
Comparisons between goods are not always that simple, and neither is the possibility
to have a clear idea about the characteristics of the product. This is particularly true for goods
which one must buy and experiment in order to make a judgement and have an informed opinion
about it. Take experience goods, which incorporate some health products and drugs, as an
example. The positive effect or the side effects of a specific drug are only observable after
taking it and those effects can take long to develop. Therefore, it may be difficult to evaluate
the quality of the product just by looking at its label or price. Hence, some beliefs may emerge
related to products but, unfortunately, these can sometimes be biased and affect negatively the
choice and optimal use of drugs. (Baicker et al., 2015).
The uncertainty regarding the use of medicines arises from many factors but, in the last
few years, more equivalent drugs have been introduced with the same characteristics of the
previously existent branded ones and they have been provoking different reactions in patients’
behavior. A generic drug, as it is called, is a “medicine which has the same qualitative and
quantitative composition in active substances and the same pharmaceutical form as the reference
2
medicine, and whose bioequivalence with the reference medicine has been demonstrated by
appropriate bioavailability studies” (WHO Collaborating Centre for Pharmaceutical Pricing and
Reimbursement Policies, 2019)). Notice, however, that, due to the avoidance of high costs in
research and development, generic drugs can be traded at a lower price, allowing for a reduction
in the overall health budget.
On one hand, many governments, including the Portuguese one, have adopted new poli-
cies that incentivize the prescription, dispensing and consumption of generic drugs. Electronic
prescription software, for instance, has become a common feature, helping physicians to have
immediate access to the list of the cheapest generic drugs when prescribing. In Portugal, for
example, it is mandatory since 2012 to prescribe medicines using only their International Non-
proprietary Name (INN), allowing the patient to choose whether to buy the generic or brand
medicine, in the pharmacy. Additionally, governments tend also to assign higher reimburse-
ments to generic drugs. Note the case of France, where the patient charge is almost zero when
it comes to generic drugs. In many countries, it is also common to see media campaigns that
have also been prepared by the national competent authorities (Barros and Nunes, 2010; Dylst
et al., 2013).
On the other hand, the low prices may be associated with low quality products by con-
sumers (Monroe, 1973; Bagwell and Riordan, 1991). In some extreme cases, there are even
some associations of generic medicines with counterfeit drugs due to the price difference, as
shown by Håkonsen and Toverud (2011), although generic medicines are also subjected to the
same safety and equivalence tests in order to get the authorization to be traded in the market.
Notwithstanding, generic medicines seem not to have the same acceptance as the original
brand-name products. Hence, many studies have been done around the world in order to try
to understand what the main reasons for a risk averse behavior from consumers toward generic
drugs are. Some authors found that some people are still unaware of the existence of equivalent
generic products with lower prices and when asked by the pharmacist if they want to buy the
generic one, they refuse, arguing that they need to confirm with their physicians whether the
generic and the brand-named products are equivalent (see Gill et al., 2010; Håkonsen et al.,
2009; Håkonsen and Toverud, 2011; Heikkilä et al., 2007). Previous positive experiences with
brand-name product and the idea that if the doctor did not mention the specific name of the
generic product it means that the other is better can also contribute to the resistance against
the purchase of generic drugs (Heikkilä, et al., 2007; Toverud et al., 2011). In addition, small
aspects that at first sight may seem irrelevant, like the color or shape of generic drugs differing
from the original branded product, may cause some unease feelings in patients that may even
misuse these drugs, resulting in a reduced effectiveness of them (Ching, 2002; Roman, 2009).
Since the doctors’ and pharmacists’ opinions seem to be a determinant factor to the ac-
ceptance for generic substitution by patients (Hassali et al., 2005; Shrank et al., 2009), some
other studies have been conducted in order to try to understand what these professionals think
about it. Shrank et al. (2011) argue that older physicians have significantly worse opinions
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about effectiveness of generic drugs than the younger ones, but all of them actually seem to be
influenced by their colleagues (Haug, 1997, Thompson, 1997; Saxell, 2014). However, Bron-
nenberg et al. (2015) also concluded that physicians are more likely to accept generic medicines
than the standard patients.
Furthermore, as described in the beginning to be one of the testes performed in this work,
it is expected that consumer’s preferences for generic drugs depend also on their socioeconomic
background. Farfan-Portet et al. (2012) found that consumers that live in small areas are more
likely to accept generic substitution for the majority of the drugs they analyzed, as well as people
that benefits from guaranteed minimum income. Moreover, it seems that higher education tends
to increase the acceptance of generic medicines (Dylst et al., 2013; Quintal and Mendes, 2012;
Vallès et al., 2003). Notice, however, that better socioeconomic conditions may have different
impacts in consumers’ preferences. On one hand, people with higher income may be more
reluctant to accept generic drugs but, on the other hand, people with higher education levels
may be more willing to accept them. In some cases, when these two factors are much correlated
with each other, it may not be possible to identify them clearly. Still, there are different results
about the impacts of age and gender on the purchase of generic drugs: Figueiras et al. (2008)
concluded that there are no significant differences between distinctive ages or gender, whereas
Himmel et al. (2005) and Heikkilä et al. (2007) concluded that people under 60 years old tend
to accept generics easily.
Chronic diseases have also been shown to have different impacts. Himmel et al. (2005)
found that patients tend to be loyal to the brand-name medicine that have been using previously
but Shrank et al. (2009) argue that some patients prefer to change to a generic drug in order to
spend less money. However, Stewart et al. (2010) and Figueiras et al. (2008) found that people
tend to accept more generic drugs when facing minor diseases, such as a cold or the flu, but tend
not to risk on changing to a generic medicine when facing heart problems, diabetes and some
other major diseases.
Despite everything, consumers also mention money savings as one of the most important
reasons for buying generic medicines (Heikkilä et al., 2007; Himmel et al., 2005) and the fact
is that there has been an increase in generic medicines sales in many countries over the last
few years. Consequently, it triggered the interest of some researchers to study the effects of the
competition that still arise when new generic products are introduced in the market. Grabowski
and Vernon (1992) concluded that shortly after a patent expires, generic drugs can capture a
large market share due to the difference between the price of the two products. Moreover, some
other authors have studied the change in the brand drugs price after the introduction of equiv-
alent generics and here the results diverge (see Caves et al., 1991; Frank and Salkever, 1997;
Hudson, 1992). Aronsson et al. (2001) studied the impact of generic medicines competition on
the market shares of the branded drugs, analyzing micro data from the Swedish drug market,
which is regulated by a Reference Price System since 1993. However, by assuming that the
demand is inelastic relatively to price, they focus more on the changes of market shares caused
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by price differences and not by differences in quantity demanded.
The drug market in Portugal has also been changing during the last years. Generic drug
sales have also been increasing and the forecast is that they will continue to increase in the
future, as argued by Barros et al. (2015). Even though the price of each medicine that re-
quires a medical prescription is previously authorized and regulated by the National Authority
of Medicines and Health Products (INFARMED, I.P.), leading to equal prices of each medicine
in the whole country, the preferences for generic drugs show a large variation between Por-
tuguese municipalities, which are the focus of this dissertation.
After this introduction, an overview on the characterization of the Portuguese drugs mar-
ket will be presented in Section 2, with a brief analysis of the Portuguese law. After that, Section
3 will describe the dataset and methodology used in this study and in Section 4 the two econo-
metric regressions will be explained and commented: the first one looks specifically for the
individual share of each medicine in comparison to the other equivalent drugs, while the second
regression takes into consideration the share of all the equivalent generic products. Section 5
will present the same analysis but assuming the special reimbursement regime existent in Por-
tugal. A quick analysis of the econometric model used will be made in Section 6 and Section
7 concludes by discussing some of the main results obtained in this dissertation, presenting the
limitations of the analysis made and some possible suggestions of work to develop in the future.
2 The Portuguese Drugs Market
The Portuguese law has a very well-defined framework according to which the Portuguese drugs
market is established. The National Authority of Medicines and Health Products (INFARMED,
I.P.) is an institute integrated in the indirect administration of the Government and reports to the
Health Ministry. Its role is to evaluate, authorize, regulate and control the human medicines and
health products in the Portuguese market. In consonance with the Decree-law no. 176/2006 of
August 30th, the INFARMED has the responsibility to manage the database that includes all the
medicines with authorization to be traded in Portugal. In order for the producer to be a market
authorization holder, it has to present a detailed requirement directed to INFARMED, including
the results of the pharmaceutical and clinical tests made to the medicines.
As established by article no. 113 of the same Decree-law, the drugs can be classified as
medicines subject to medical prescription or not, depending on the risk that they may cause
to patients when administrated without medical vigilance, when taken in certain quantities and
some other aspects. The latter are usually not reimbursed by the Government, except for some
specific cases. However, these can be bought in a great variety of shops apart from pharmacies,
such as supermarkets and service stations but, in accordance with article no. 1 of the Decree-law
no. 238/2007, that was changed by the Law no. 51/2014, they are not reimbursed. Apart from
that, the prices of medicines not subjected to medical prescription sold outside pharmacies are
not controlled, except for those subjected to a maximum price.
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The maximum price regime was assigned to the medicines requiring medical prescription
as well as to the medicines not requiring it but that are reimbursed by the Government, by the
article no. 3 of the Decree-law no. 112/2011 that was changed by the Decree-law no. 34/2013.
However, from 2015 onwards, the Decree-law no. 97/2015 defines that the medicines covered
by the maximum price regime should be specified in a government ordinance, which in case
are defined be the Ordinance no. 195-C/2015, article no. 2, but remain the same. In those
cases, the market authorization holder may charge lower prices but never higher prices than the
defined maximum price. The maximum price is defined by INFARMED since 2012 (according
to the Decree-law no. 152/2012, article no. 2, that introduces changes to the Decree-law no.
112/2011, and was updated by the Decree-law no. 97/2015).
There are two reimbursement regimes in Portugal, as established by the Decree-law no.
48-A/2010 from May 13th, in the version of the Decree-law no. 106-A/2010 from October 1st.
Hence, the general regime has four reimbursement categories defined, A, B, C and D, which
are reimbursed at 90%, 69%, 37% and 15%, respectively. The medicines are distributed to
these categories in accordance to a government ordinance, updated in 2015 by the Ordinance
no. 195-D/2015, article no. 2. On the other hand, there is the special regime with higher
percentages, that is applied to people with low income, such when the yearly income is lower
or equal to fourteen times the guaranteed minimum monthly income, or even to medicines used
to treat certain diseases specified in a government ordinance (see articles no. 19 and 20 from
the Appendix of the Decree-law no. 48-A/2010).
When there is at least one generic medicine with the same qualitative and quantitative
composition in terms of the active substances, pharmaceutical form, dosage and route of admin-
istration, homogeneous groups are formed and published by the INFARMED, in accordance to
the Decree-law no. 103/2013, updated by the Ordinance no. 195-B/2015.
Moreover, it is approved by the government members the reference price for each ho-
mogeneous group, previously proposed by the INFARMED. Since 2010 the reference price is
computed as the price of the generic product with the highest maximum price in each homo-
geneous group, and it will be over this reference price that the government reimburse will be
applied (article no. 25 from the Appendix of the Decree-law no. 48-A/2010) However, from
2015 onwards, the reference price is computed as the average of maximum prices of the 5
generic drugs with the lowest prices (article no. 19 of the Decree-Law no. 97/2015). Therefore,
the maximum government reimbursement for the general regime of drugs covered by the refer-
ence price system will be equal to the percentage of the respective category times the reference
price (article no. 28 of the Appendix of the Decree-law no. 48-A/2010).
It is worth mentioning that, since 2012, the medical prescription must be done using not
the name of the drug brand, but the International Non-proprietary Name (INN) of the active
substance instead. However, the physician may just in a few cases specify the brand of the
medicine that should be used by the patient, such as when the drug will be used to continue a
treatment already started (Article no. 2 of the Law no. 11/2012). When buying the medicine
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at the pharmacy, each patient should be informed about other existing equivalent drugs and the
ones that are reimbursed by the government. It is mandatory that all the pharmacies have at least
3 of the 5 generic drugs with the lowest prices for each homogeneous group and they should sell
the one with the lowest price to patients. Nevertheless, the customers have the right to choose
which one they prefer among the ones with the same INN, pharmaceutical form and dosage
according to the medical prescription (Article no. 3 of the Law no. 11/2012).
One should also note that in Portugal the medicines are also classified according to their
pharmacotherapeutic classification. This classification has a direct correspondence with the
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Code (ATC code) which is controlled by the World Health
Organization (WHO), specifically the Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology.
This code is internationally used and it groups the medicines according to the organ or system
of organs over which the drugs act in the body, as well as their therapeutic, pharmacological
and chemical properties. One can check this correspondence by reading, for instance, the Order
of the Secretary of the State for Health no. 4742/2014, of March 21st. Another aspect of the
ATC code is that is it composed by 5 different levels and the first one (the first letter of the code)
relates to the anatomical main group.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Sample selection
In order to study the consumers’ preferences, a database that includes the sales of each drug
aggregated in municipalities was used. It was kindly made available by the Portuguese National
Association of Pharmacies (Associação Nacional de Farmácias - ANF) for this study and con-
tains monthly data on the sales in value and in volume between the years 2013 and 2018, as
well as some variables that characterize each drug, such as if the drug is a generic one, its ho-
mogeneous group, its ATC code and its official reimbursement by the National Health Service
(NHS). However, only about 82% to 85% of the Portuguese pharmacies report their sales to
ANF, which means that it was not possible to have access to the whole Portuguese drug market.
As a consequence, the sample includes only 305 of the 308 counties, with São Vicente, Lajes
das Flores and Corvo not being represented.
Simultaneously, a group of socioeconomic variables that allows for the characterization
of each Portuguese county was also collected from the Portuguese National Statistics Institute
(Instituto Nacional de Estatística - INE). However, these variables were only available for coun-
ties with an annual periodicity and up to the year of 2017. Consequently, in order to cross the
two databases, it was needed to convert the monthly data on drug sales into annual data. More-
over, the period of the analysis was reduced to the years 2013 to 2017 in order to be possible
to characterize the counties (See Table 1 for a description of the data selection). Regarding the
variables related to the level of education, such as the percentage of people more than 14 years
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Table 1: Number of observations during the data selection process
Description Observations %
Initial number of observations 13,192,020 100
Keeping only the products whose characteristics were available 13,190,496 99,99
Eliminating health products (e.g. cosmetics and medical devices) 11,507,340 87,23
Keeping just the medicines that require medical prescriptions 11,494,416 87,13
Eliminating the observations with sales in volume equal to zero 7,511,902 56,94
Eliminating sales for 2018 (since some socioeconomic variables
are not available)
6,337,866 48,04
Keeping only the medicines that belong to a homogeneous group
at least on one period
4,203,155 31,86
Crossing with the socioeconomic variables and imputing each
drug code to each county for every period
11,427,740 86,63
Keeping only the medicines for which at least one medicine of
their homogeneous group was sold (Tables 5 and 10)
9,620,593 72,93
Keeping just one observation for each homogeneous group
(Tables 6 and 11)
933,919 7,08
old that completed only the high-school, that have an academic degree or that did not complete
any educational level at all, are only available at a county level from the Censos database. The
last data collection is of 2011, two years before the first year of our database, but these variables
were still introduced since they are considered as the best proxy for the educational level of the
population possible. Hence, all the socioeconomic variables change annually, except for the
education related ones that were considered constant over the whole period. See Table 2 for
a description of the socioeconomic variables. Notice that one observation is the detail of one
medicine in a county, for a given year.
Hence, the used database included the sales of each drug in each county, but then select-
ing the drugs was necessary. Firstly, only the drugs that require a medical prescription were
considered since these are the ones that have their prices controlled. Additionally, because it is
of our interest to study the preference for generic drugs, only the medicines that have at least
one equivalent generic drug were considered, ignoring all the medicines without generic equiv-
alents. Thus, only the drugs that belonged to one homogeneous group at least during one period
were kept.
The homogeneous groups are one crucial aspect of this analysis. In fact, all the shares will
be computed considering the number of units sold of the individual medicines or the number
of units sold of all the generic drugs in the total of units sold in the respective homogeneous
group. The reason for this is that, as previously mention in Section 2, one homogeneous group
includes all the equivalent drugs in terms of the qualitative and quantitative composition of
the active substances, pharmaceutical form, dosage and route of administration. Therefore, the
analysis will be performed inside of each homogeneous group, which identifies the equivalent
drugs. It is worth mentioning that the optimal unit of measure would be the Defined Daily Dose
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Table 2: Socioeconomic variables
Variable Description
youngpeople Percentage of resident population less than 25 years old
old people Percentage of resident population more or equal than 65
years old
total pop Average of the total resident population
pharmpc Number of pharmacies per capita
minincome Percentage of the resident population that benefits from the
guaranteed minimum income
unemp Percentage of the adult resident population enrolled in the
Employment and Professional Training Institutes
density Population density
income Average basic remuneration by worker
noeduc Percentage of resident population with more than 14 years
old with no education
highsch Percentage of resident population with more than 14 years
old with only the high school completed
acdegree Percentage of resident population with more than 14 years
old with
Notes: This Table reports the socioeconomic variables taken into consideration in the cluster analysis. All of them,
except for the totalpop, were also included in the regressions analyzed in Section 4.
(DDD) which is defined as the “average maintenance dose per day for a drug used for its main
indication in adults” by the WHO (2019), since it would allow us to control for the fact that
one person might take one pill with 500mg or two pills with 1g of the same active substance.
However, DDD was not available in the ANF database and so this analysis focus on the shares
in units (for instance, pills and ampoules).
Additionally, it will be computed the out-of-pocket price per unit for each medicine so
as to consider the differences in their prices. Thus, the unitary out-of-pocket price considered
is calculated as the difference in the price per unit of one drug and the unitary price of the
equivalent drug with the lowest price in their respective homogeneous group. Moreover, the
unitary prices previously mentioned are not the total price of the medicines but only the part
actually paid by consumers.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Just by using some simple descriptive statistics, it was possible to identify some facts. The
number of medicines sold has been decreasing from 2013 to 2017, in about 800 homogeneous
groups, as shown in panel a) of Figure 1. Moreover, the market share of generic drugs in units
sold has been slightly increasing, despite the fact of the total number of units sold of all the
medicines has been decreasing (see panel b) of Figure 1).
There can also be seen some differences in the consumption patterns across the different
regions of Portugal. In a first analysis, the Portuguese counties were organized into 5 groups
according to their socioeconomic characteristics (see Figure 2 for a geographical localization of
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Figure 1: No. of units sold (all medicines)
Notes: Panel a) reports the number of different medicines that are subjected to medical prescription sold in each
year, in bars. In grey, in the same graph, the number of homogeneous groups among which the drugs sold are
included is represented. Panel b) reports the number of medicines sold in each year, in total of units, and the
proportion of generic and branded products are shown inside each bar.
the counties belonging to each group), using a k-means clustering method, and the coast ones
immediately stood out from the interior municipalities, with a special highlight of the counties
from the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas. (The list of the counties by group can be found in
the Appendix). The group number 2 that includes only the counties of Lisbon, Sintra and Vila
Nova de Gaia is the one with a higher level of socioeconomic conditions, opposed to the group
number 5 that includes 174 counties mainly from the interior of the country where there is a
higher percentage of old population, as well as a higher percentage of people with no education
or that benefit from the guaranteed minimum income. See Table 3, which shows the relative
characterization of the groups.
It can be recognized that the third group is the one with more intermediate values for the
majority of the considered variables. On one hand, groups 2 and 4 have a higher average of total
resident population, as well as higher population density, higher average basic remuneration by
worker and higher percentage of resident population with more education. It is notorious that
these are the groups with more “++” signs. On the other hand, these groups oppose the first and
fifth ones, which have lower levels of total resident population, lower population density, lower
average basic remuneration by worker and higher percentage of population without education.
Groups 1 and 5 are also the ones with lower percentage of resident people less than 25 years old
but higher percentage of residents more than 64 years old. This division is not straightforward
regarding the variables related to the number of pharmacies per resident, the percentage of
resident people benefiting from the guaranteed minimum income and the ones enrolled in the
Employment and Professional Training Institutes, that works as a proxy for the unemployment
rate. Nonetheless, the groups can be ordered by a decreasing level of various socioeconomic
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Figure 2: Groups of counties
Notes: This Figure shows the geographical localization of the counties belonging to each group that resulted from
the cluster analysis.
indicators as follows: 2>4>3>1>5.
Although medicines for the cardiovascular system, nervous system and alimentary tract
are the ones more bought (see the correspondence between the first level of the ATC code and
the organ or system of organs over which the medicines act in the Appendix), there are yet
some differences across municipalities (see Figure 3). Lisbon, Sintra and Vila Nova de Gaia,
for instance, are the ones where less units of medicines that act in the cardiovascular system
(code C) are bought but are where more drugs for the respiratory system (code R) are bought,
opposed to the counties in the interior. Therefore, some medicines sell more in different regions,
probably due to the health problems that may vary between counties. The coast counties suffer
more from air pollution and indeed seem to be the ones that need more medicines for respiratory
diseases.
As it can be seen in part a) of Table 4, the shares of medicines in their respective homoge-
neous group are higher for group 2, meaning that this is the group that diversifies less between
the available equivalent drugs, as well as the group number 4. On the other hand, the coun-
ties from group 5 are the ones that have lower market shares of each equivalent drug, which
indicates that more equivalent drugs are bought at the same time.
We can also have an idea of the differences between regions related to the preferences
for generic or branded products. In panel b) of Table 4, the average of the shares of all the
equivalent generic products for each group of counties is represented. Notice that these shares
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youngpeople – | ++ + – –
old people + | – – – ++
total pop – ++ | + – –
pharmpc + | – – – ++
minincome – – ++ | – +
unemp – – ++ | + –
density – ++ | + – –
income – ++ | + – –
noeduc + – – | – ++
highsch – ++ | + – –
acdegree – ++ | + – –
Notes: This Table represents the relative characterization of the groups of counties. The sign “– –” indicates the
group of counties with the lowest average value of the respective variable, opposed to the sign “+ +” that indicates
the group of municipalities with the highest average value. The vertical bar indicates the intermediate one. In order
to create the groups, it was considered annual data on every mentioned variable for each of the 308 Portuguese
municipalities between 2013 and 2018, with the exception of the variables noeduc, highsch, and acdegree that
were assumed constant over time for each county.
were computed in each homogeneous group and in the table we have only an aggregated mean
of all the homogeneous groups, not controlling for the possibility of some counties buying more
of one specific type of medicines that can even have more equivalent generic drugs available
to choose while others buy more of another type of drugs without many generic substitutes
available. However, it is possible to have an idea that the municipalities belonging to group 5
(the group with the lower socioeconomic conditions and less education) are the ones that buy
a higher percentage of generic drugs, opposed to the more developed counties. Moreover, it is
even possible to see that the generic shares are slightly increasing during the period in analysis,
as expected.
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Figure 3: Types of drugs bought by groups of counties
Notes: The Figure reports the shares of medicines sold (in units) included in each ATC code, only until the first
level. Notice that it identifies the anatomical main group of the medicines, i.e. the system or group of organs over
which the medicine acts.
Table 4: Shares of individual drugs and generic drugs as a whole




1 2 3 4 5
2013 10.61% 11.50% 10.91% 11.22% 10.09% 10.86%
2014 9.86% 10.56% 10.11% 10.36% 9.38% 10.05%
2015 9.74% 10.36% 9.93% 10.17% 9.25% 9.89%
2016 9.67% 10.25% 9.89% 10.10% 9.19% 9.82%
2017 9.62% 10.16% 9.83% 10.02% 9.13% 9.75%
Average 9.89% 10.55% 10.12% 10.36% 9.40%




1 2 3 4 5
2013 53.67% 57.49% 55.58% 57.38% 52.47% 55.32%
2014 55.79% 58.95% 57.36% 59.25% 54.67% 57.20%
2015 56.84% 59.67% 58.19% 59.48% 55.81% 58.00%
2016 57.09% 59.38% 58.25% 59.45% 56.36% 58.10%
2017 57.66% 59.54% 58.73% 59.65% 57.09% 58.53%
Average 56.21% 59.01% 57.62% 59.04% 55.28%
Notes: Panel a) reports the average share, in units, of the individual medicines sold in each group of counties over
the period in analysis. These shares are calculated with respect of the homogeneous group in which the medicines




4.1 Changes in individual drug market shares when new equivalent
medicines are introduced
In order to try to understand the changes in the share of each individual drug when a new equiv-
alent generic is introduced in the market, a regression was run. It takes the variable drugshare as
its dependent variable, representing the share of each medicine in the total sales of its respective
homogeneous group, in units, in the considered county and year. Assuming that the shares may
vary depending on the fact that the product is a generic or not, the variable generic is included,
which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observed drug is a generic product and
0 otherwise. It was also expected that the medicines with higher prices paid by consumers have
lower shares when compared to the other equivalent drugs, and so the unitary out-of-pocket
price was computed and introduced in the regression with the logarithm (log(outpocketuni)).1
Because we are only interested in comparing the shares of the equivalent drugs sold, i.e. the
drugs that belong to the same homogeneous group, the unitary out-of-pocket price was com-
puted as the difference in the price of that specific drug and the price of the equivalent drug
with the lowest price in the respective homogeneous group, as previously mentioned, per unit.
Moreover, due to the aggregation of the data in counties, it was not possible to distinguish which
and how many drug sales were covered by the general or the special reimbursement regimes.
However, since the majority of the sales are covered by the general regime (see Table 9 in the
Appendix), the analysis was made assuming this regime for all the sales.2So as to allow for
some differences in the drug shares between the different regions that are characterized by their
socioeconomic variables, these were also included: youngpeople, oldpeople, pharmpc, minin-
come, unemp, density, income, noeduc, highsch and acdegree. Additionally, in order to study
the impact of the introduction of new equivalent drugs in the market, two new crucial variables
were created as well: the variable newgen identifies the number of new generic drugs in that
homogeneous group for that year, and newbrand identifies the number of new branded prod-
ucts that entered in that homogeneous group in that period. So as to allow different effects
on the market share of generic versus branded drugs sold inside their respective homogeneous
group and county, these last two variables were also crossed with the dummy variable generic.
Therefore, the first estimated regression is the following:
1The variable outpocketuni is introduced in the regression with the logarithm in order to simplify the interpreta-
tion of its coefficient. In this way, the obtained coefficient is a semi-elasticity. Therefore, the interpretation should
be that an increase in the price paid by patients of 1% will lead to an increase (or decrease, in the case of a negative
sign) of the drug share of X/100 units. Since we are considering the share, which is a number between 0 and 1 (or
a percentage) its unit is the percentage point (p.p.).
2The same analysis assuming the special reimbursement regime will be done in Section 5.
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drugsharem,c,t = β0+β1genericm+β2 log(out pocketuni)m,c,t +β3newgeng,t +β4newbrandg,t+
+β5newgeng,t ×genericm +β6newbrandg,t ×genericm +βXc,t +αZc + εm,c,t (1)
where the vector X represents all the socioeconomic variables that change across time and
Z represents the variables related to education (remember that they were assumed as constant).
Regarding the components, m identifies each medicine, g identifies the homogeneous group,
t relates to the year and c identifies the county. Remark that the variables drugshare, generic
and outpocketuni do not have the component g that identifies the homogeneous group, since
one specific drug can only be part of one group. Therefore, each medicine m is immediately
identified by the matching homogeneous group.
Notice that a positive coefficient indicates that the variable contributes to a higher share
of each medicine m sold in the total sales of its respective homogeneous group g, in units, in the
considered county c and period t. On one hand, if the obtained coefficient β1 is positive (the one
associated with the dummy variable generic), it means that the share of each individual generic
drug is greater than the one for a branded-name product, on average, considering everything else
constant. Similarly, if a positive β2 is obtained, it means that the higher the unitary out-of-pocket
price, the higher the expected share of the individual medicine, on average, ceteris paribus. Re-
garding the coefficient on the generic variable, no information is known until now that allows to
predict its sign but, as previously mentioned, it is expected that a higher price leads to a lower
drug share, since people usually respond to higher prices with lower quantities demanded, thus
it is expected a negative coefficient associated with the variable log(out pocketuni). Addition-
ally, the coefficient on newgen, β3, is expected to be negative, indicating that the shares of the
branded products sold tend to reduce when new equivalent generic drugs are introduced. Sim-
ilarly, the sum of β3 and β5 is also expected to be negative, with the value of β5 reinforcing
the effect of β3, since one more equivalent generic drug in the market is expected to reduce the
individual shares of the other generic drugs already existent, even more than the reduction in the
individual shares of the brand medicines. Likewise, the coefficients β4 and β6, associated with
the effects of the introduction of new equivalent brand medicines, are expected to be negative
too. However, it is worth mentioning that it is not very common for new equivalent brand drugs
to appear in the market after the patent expiration of other brand products already established
in the market and, consequently, the coefficients may not be statistically significative.
Finally, regarding the socioeconomic variables included, a positive coefficient will also
represent that the higher the value of each variable, the higher will be the individual share of
each drug, in the correspondent homogeneous group, county and year. In that way, a positive
coefficient associated with the variable unemp, for instance, means that people from a county
characterized by a higher proportion of adult people enrolled in Employment and Professional
Training Institute, i.e. with more unemployment, tend to diversify less the medicines bought
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when compared to resident people in a county with lower unemployment, since higher drug
shares is only possible to obtain when less medicines are sold. Thus, the coefficients associated
with each of the socioeconomic variables will allow us to identify if those characteristics can
be associated with a higher or lower degree of diversity.
It is expected that the counties with a higher percentage of young people are more avail-
able to diversify, opposed to those with a higher percentage of old people. Similarly, the higher
the number of pharmacies per resident as well as the higher the population density, the higher
the diversity is expected to be, resulting in lower shares. Additionally, it is expected that peo-
ple that benefit from the guaranteed minimum income or unemployed are more available to
try different medicines and thus diversify more, opposed to the ones with higher income, thus
leading to negative coefficients associated with variables minincome and unemp but a positive
one associated with income. People with higher education are usually more informed about
the equivalence of generic drugs and so the coefficients associated with highsch and acdegree
are expected to be negative, indicating that the drugs shares are low for counties with higher
levels of education, contrasting to the coefficient on noeduc that is expected to be positive for
the opposed reason.
The coefficients obtained are shown in the first columns of Table 5.
Table 5: Outputs from equations (1) and (2)
Dependent variable: drugshare (1) (2)
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
generic −.2265 0.000 −0.2552 0.000
log(out pocketuni) −0.0086 0.000 −0.0086 0.000
newgen −0.0016 0.000 −0.0029 0.000
newbrand −0.1707 0.000 −0.1800 0.000
newgen×generic −0.0033 0.000 −0.0014 0.000
newbrand ×generic 0.1825 0.000 0.1933 0.000
youngpeople 0.0259 0.000 0.0383 0.000
old people −0.0002 0.952 0.0031 0.425
pharmpc −2.5887 0.000 −2.4961 0.000
minincome −0.0448 0.000 −0.0498 0.000
unemp 0.0463 0.000 0.0555 0.000
density 5.24e−7 0.000 4.84e−7 0.000
income −3.22e−6 0.000 −4.11e−6 0.000
noeduc −0.0109 0.001 −0.0095 0.003
highsch 0.0010 0.779 −0.0003 0.941
acdegree 0.0372 0.000 0.0401 0.000
relativeage −0.0072 0.000
relativeage×generic 0.0094 0.000
constant 0.2403 0.000 0.2581 0.000
Number of observations 9,620,593 9,620,593
R-squared 0.1709 0.1714
Notes: The Table shows the obtained coefficients and p-values for regressions (1) and (2), run using the OLS
estimators and assuming the general reimbursement regimes for all the sales.
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The shares of generic products are smaller by, on average, 0.2265 p.p than the shares
of the equivalent branded medicines, as shown by the coefficient associated with the dummy
variable generic (β1). This may happen due to two main reasons: there are more generic drugs
in each homogeneous group, on average, and so the individual share of each one is smaller, but
it is also possible that people buy more branded products in total. In fact, the average number
of generic drugs in each homogeneous group is 8.7, whereas the average number of brand-
name drugs is 1.7. Nevertheless, the last hypothesis is not supported by the descriptive statistics
presented before (see panel b) of Table 4 in the previous section), so it was concluded that, the
lower shares of the generic drugs has to do with the higher availability of generic equivalent
products. Also, as expected, as the out-of-pocket price increases by 1%, it is estimated that the
share of the product decreases by 0.000086 p.p., on average. Thus, the higher the price, the
lower the share of the product, but by a small amount.
The diversification between equivalent medicines may arise in part from the consumers’
habits but also from the availability of different drugs in each region. Despite the pharmacies
having to provide access to at least three of the five equivalent generic drugs, if there are more
pharmacies in a county there may also be available different generics, since each pharmacy
could provide different equivalent generic products, from different producers. Actually, the
coefficient on the variable pharmpc is negative, meaning that the more pharmacies per resident
tend to lead to lower shares of each drug, which supports this idea.
Notice, however, that the counties with a higher percentage of people benefiting from the
guaranteed minimum income have lower shares of each individual medicine, considering ev-
erything else constant, since the coefficient on minincome is negative, which means that people
tend to diversify more between the equivalent drugs. What is unexpected is the fact that the
coefficient on income is also negative, meaning that the counties with people receiving a higher
income also tend to diversify, not being loyal to one specific brand. Regarding the education
level, it is interesting to see that people with an academic degree seem to be more loyal to the
same drugs, not allowing for a great diversity, since the shares tend to be lower when compared
to people without any education: note that the coefficient on acdegree is positive, whereas the
one associated with noeduc is negative meaning that people with no education tend to buy less
units of the same equivalent medicine, opposed to the expected results. It was also estimated
that, ceteris paribus, the counties in which there is a higher percentage of young people, a
higher percentage of unemployed people or even the ones with a higher population density are
the ones in which the individual drug shares are higher, meaning that these tend to be loyal to
the same medicines, without diversifying contrarily to the expected hypothesis.
Besides these regional preferences, let us then focus on what happens to the shares when
new equivalent drugs are introduced in the market: it is estimated that when a new equivalent
generic medicine is introduced, the share of all the other (equivalent) drugs decreases, with the
share of the generic drugs decreasing more 0.0033 p.p. than the shares of branded drugs (see
coefficients β3 and β5 in the second column of Table 5). On the other hand, in the case of
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an introduction of a new equivalent branded product (like the situation in which another brand
produces an identical product to one already in the market), the shares of the branded medicines
are expected to decrease even more than when it was a new generic drug entering the market
(they are expected to decrease by 0.1707 p.p. when a new branded product enters the market, but
decrease only 0.0016 p.p. when the entering product is a generic one). Notwithstanding, a new
branded drug is expected to increase the shares of the generic products by, on average, 0.0117!
This is an unpredicted but curious result! However, it is worth mentioning that the introduction
of a non-generic product in an already existent homogeneous group is not very common since,
usually, the branded products are the first ones to be developed and commercialized and only
after the patent expiration new equivalent generic products appear in the market, thus leading
to the creation of the homogeneous group.
The R-squared of this regression is not really high, but it must be considered that there
are many other variables that certainly explain the shares of medicines and are not considered
in the equation. Examples of these possible features are hereditary factors that may contribute
to a necessity to certain medicines, consumers aversion to generic drugs or even previous al-
lergic reactions of some active substances included in drugs. These are factors that can only
be exploited if individual data is available, which is not the case in this study, but they were
assumed as uncorrelated with the main variables included in the regression. This might be an
unrealistic assumption, but it is what was possible with the available data. Notice, however, that
these aspects not covered in the regression will be included in the error term, εm,c,t . Note also
that only two socioeconomic variables seem to be non-statistically significant: oldpeople and
highsch, which means that they do not seem to explain the dependent variable drugshare.
4.2 The market share of each individual drug as time passes by
The literature has already shown that there is a certain aversion to the consumption of generic
products in detriment of branded drugs. However, many governments are trying to solve this
problem by applying some new policies and even advertisement campaigns that may lead to a
lower aversion from consumers. Specifically in Portugal, some measures have been taken, such
as the previously mentioned requirement that the medical prescriptions must be done using the
NII instead of the brand of the medicine, which can be considered as part of a nudge technique
that tries to influence consumers’ behavior without forbidding brand drugs, or the requirement
that pharmacies have available at least three of the five generic products with the lowest prices
of their respective homogeneous group, as an attempt to guarantee that generic products are
available. Additionally, the INFARMED has been practicing some marketing and information
campaigns in order to contribute to a well-informed society. But are these measures having a
positive effect? In order to test if the measures that promote generic drugs have been effective,
one more variable was created and included in the previous model: relativeage. This variable
identifies the age of the medicine starting at 2012, i.e. it takes the value 1 in the first period of
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the sample with positive sales and after that it sums one as one more year passes by. This is just
a simple way of controlling for what happen as time passes, from the moment when the drug
first appears in the database onwards. So as to allow different effects on the share of generic
versus branded drugs, it was also crossed with the dummy variable generic and, if policies are
having positive effects, it is expected a negative sign on β7 but a positive and greater one on β8.
Therefore, the estimated regression now is the following:
drugsharem,c,t = β0+β1genericm+β2 log(out pocketuni)m,c,t +β3newgeng,t +β4newbrandg,t+
+β5newgeng,t ×genericm +β6newbrandg,t ×genericm+
+β7relativeagem,t +β8relativeagem,t ×genericm +βXc,t +αZc + εm,c,t (2)
As previously mentioned, the vector X represents all the socioeconomic variables that
change across time, and Z represents the variables related to education (they were assumed as
constant over time). The components are also the same as in the previous regression.
The R-squared increased slightly, but the difference is not that significant. Nonetheless,
the coefficients obtained (see Table 5) are very similar to the previous regression without the
two new variables. Hence, one can easily see that, everything else constant, the shares of the
generic and non-generic drugs tend to change in different directions: branded products tend to
have lower shares over the years, while the generic products tend to see their shares increase
over time. Moreover, we estimate that one more year makes generic shares increase by 0.0022
p.p., on average, while the branded product shares tend to decrease by 0.0072 p.p. as one more
year passes by, on average. Thus, the decrease of the non-generic product shares is higher in
absolute value than the increase in the generic drug shares.
Therefore, one can conclude that the policies and measures that have been implemented
seem to be effective, since the predictions about the coefficient signs were verified. Thus, as
time passes by it can be observed an increase on generic drugs shares and a decrease on the
shares of non-generic products, ceteris paribus.
4.3 The market shares of all the equivalent generic drugs
The previous regressions allow us to understand what happens to the consumption of each
individual drug, being it a generic product or not, when there are some changes in selected
socioeconomic variables, the drug’s prices and even some changes in the composition of the
homogeneous group. It also allows us to identify some consumer’s preferences over the same
medicines or their availability to diversify. However, if we are talking about equivalent drugs
and the focus is the share of generic products as a whole, we should actually try to understand
what happens to their aggregated shares in the respective homogeneous group. It was seen that
generic drugs tend to have lower shares than the non-generic ones, but is it true that the share
of all the equivalent generic drugs is smaller than the share of the branded products? In order
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to answer this question, no econometric regression is needed. Computing the average of the
generics’ share in each homogeneous group we get a value of 56,2%, which means that for
the competitive drug market where substitutes are available, the generic drugs have a higher
share than the branded ones. But how does it change when new medicines are introduced in
the homogeneous group? A new econometric regression was estimated in order to answer this
question that also helps us to understand consumer’s preferences over generic drugs:




βkDk,g +βXc,t +αZc + εg,c,t
(3)
Similarly to the previous equations, the vector X represents all the socioeconomic vari-
ables that change across time, and Z represents the variables related to education (assumed as
constant over time). Once again, the components are the same.
The dependent variable is now the share of all the generic drugs in their respective homo-
geneous group g, in period t and for the county c. The regressors included are the previous so-
cioeconomic variables, the number of new generic drugs introduced in the homogeneous group
g in period t (newgen), a new variable named genericprop that represents the proportion of the
generic products that exist in the homogeneous group g at time t, and some dummy variables
that identify the ATC code (until the first level) of the observed homogeneous group g. This
said, we are now looking just at the homogeneous group level, and not taking into consideration
the individual medicines that belong to it, so it is as if we have now a more general overview of
the market.
Notice that a positive coefficient associated with the genericprop is expected, since more
equivalent generic drugs available should also lead to a higher percentage of generic drugs sold,
as a whole. However, the coefficient on the variable newgen must be interpreted very carefully:
in order for us to interpret it directly, using a ceteris paribus analysis, we should consider that
the proportion of generic drugs in the respective homogeneous group should remain unchanged,
since the variable genericprop is also included in the regression. Therefore, a positive coefficient
on the variable newgen means that adding one more generic drug in one homogeneous group
while adding the correspondent proportion of branded medicines such that the proportion of
generic ones does not change, the total share of generic drugs sold will increase, and so the
generic drugs will capture a higher proportion of the market.
Additionally, positive coefficients associated with a socioeconomic variable will now
mean that the higher its value is, the higher the consumption of generic drugs will be. For
instance, a positive coefficient associated with the variable unemp means that, ceteris paribus,
the counties with higher levels of unemployment seem to be the ones with a higher preference
for generic drugs. Thus, it is expected a positive coefficient associated with the variable young-
people, opposing the one associated with oldpeople, since the elder tend to be more reluctant to
changes of habits. The counties with a higher number of pharmacies per resident are also ex-
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pected to have a higher share of all the equivalent generic drugs since more equivalent generic
drugs will be available and so it is expected a positive coefficient on pharmpc. Since people
with high education levels are usually more informed, the coefficients on highsch and acdegree
are expected to be positive too. Contrarily to these, the coefficient on noeduc is expected to be
negative for the opposite reason, as well as the one associated with the variable income, due to
the fact that people with high income may prefer to continue using the same brand-name prod-
ucts and be more reluctant to change. Counties with a higher percentage of unemployed people
and higher percentage of people benefiting from the guaranteed minimum income are expected
to buy more generics and so the coefficients associated with unemp and minincome will be pos-
itive. Similarly, due to the easier spread of information where the population density is higher,
it is expected a positive coefficient on density, too. Finally, the dummy variables that identify
the first level of the ATC code will allow us to see if there are some significant differences in
the consumers’ preferences for generic drugs depending on the organ or system of organs over
which the medicines act.
The obtained coefficients are shown in the first columns of Table 6.
Regarding the socioeconomic factors considered, it is interesting to see that the higher the
average income in the municipality, the lower the generic share, probably indicating that people
with a higher income are more willing to pay a higher price and buy the branded product.
On the other hand, the higher the percentage of unemployment in the county, the higher the
generic consumption as well, but the more percentage of people that benefit from the guaranteed
minimum income, the lower the generic shares, which is an unexpected result since it seems to
go against the obtained coefficient on the income.
It was also expected the people with higher levels of education, who are well-informed
about the equivalence and availability of the generic products, would be the ones that could buy
more generics. However, the coefficient on acdegree is negative, which supports the opposite
and contradicts the previous literature (see Dylst et al., 2013; Quintal and Mendes, 2012 and
Vallès et al., 2003). This seems to be a situation in which the correlation between income
and level of education is very high (note that the correlation between these two variables –
income and acdegree – is about 0.66), leading to unexpected results, as previously argued.
Furthermore, there seems not to be significant differences in the preferences for generic drugs
between people of different ages, with the coefficients associated with the percentage of young
and old people being both negatives. The coefficient on density confirms that the counties
with higher population density have higher preferences for generic drugs as expected, since a
positive coefficient was obtained, but it was curious to find a negative coefficient associated
with the variable pharmpc, which contradicts the prediction that more pharmacies would lead
to higher shares of the generic drugs in total.
Particularly interesting are the results obtained for the variables related to the composition
of the homogeneous group. The coefficient on genericprop indicates that as the percentage of
generic drugs existent in the homogeneous group increases by 1 p.p., the generics share is esti-
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Table 6: Outputs from equations (3) and (4)
Dependent variable: genericshare (3) (4)
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
genericprop 0.9255 0.000 0.9125 0.000
newgen −0.0358 0.000 −0.0355 0.000
youngpeople −0.1341 0.000 −0.2072 0.000
old people −0.0993 0.000 −0.1320 0.000
pharmpc −7.5622 0.000 −6.2637 0.005
minincome −0.1617 0.000 −0.1521 0.000
unemp 0.2993 0.000 0.3283 0.000
density 3.65e−6 0.000 4.25e−6 0.000
income −1.22e−5 0.000 −1.31e−5 0.004
noeduc −0.0155 0.268 −0.0047 0.786
highsch 0.0138 0.387 0.0192 0.335
acdegree −0.0557 0.000 −0.1177 0.000
A 0.0256 0.000 0.0257 0.000
B 0.0253 0.000 0.0466 0.000
D 0.0053 0.026 −0.0799 0.000
G −0.0784 0.000 −0.1578 0.000
H −0.0697 0.000 −0.1713 0.000
J −0.0313 0.000 −0.0372 0.000
L 0.1231 0.000 0.1452 0.000
M −0.0044 0.000 −0.0238 0.000
N 0.0059 0.000 −0.0072 0.000
R −0.1116 0.000 −0.1712 0.000
S −0.2791 0.000 −0.5804 0.000
pricedi f 0.0217 0.000
constant −0.0066 0.471 0.0070 0.540
Number of observations 933,919 717,032
R-squared 0.5350 0.3362
Notes: This Table shows the results obtained with regressions (3) and (4), using the OLS estimators. For the
calculation of the variable pricedif in regression (4), it was assumed that all medicines were covered by the general
reimbursement regime. The dummy variables A to S represent the first level of the ATC code, with category C
being the base level. See Table 7 in the Appendix for the correspondence between the ATC code and the group of
organs that they represent. The number of observations in equation (4) is smaller than in the previous regression
because for some homogeneous groups only generic products or only branded drugs were sold. As a consequence,
it is not possible to compute the variable pricedif for those observations and they were excluded.
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mated to increase by, on average, 0.9255 p.p., as it was expected, supporting the hypothesis that
the more generic products available, the higher the generics share. However, as previously men-
tioned, one should interpret the coefficient on newgen very carefully. This coefficient is negative
(−0.0358) which means that, ceteris paribus, one more generic drug leads to a decrease in the
generics share. Nevertheless, note that it is true only if we consider that all the other variables
remain constant. Thus, in order for the proportion of the generics in the homogeneous group
to remain constant when one more generic product is introduced, we need to be introducing
the same proportion of branded products. Consequently, that coefficient indicates that as we
introduce one more generic drug in the homogeneous group while introducing at the same time
the equivalent proportion of non-generic products, the share of all generic products is expected
to decrease by, on average, 0.0358 p.p.. As previously mentioned, it is not very common that
new branded products enter the market in a homogeneous group that already exists. However,
this regression allows us to see that if we introduce the same proportion of generic and branded
products, the last ones will immediately capture a higher share of the market.
The dummy variables that allow to identify the organ or system of the human body over
which the medicines react allow us to identify that there are in fact some differences in the
utilization of generic groups depending on the type of medicine. The group used as the reference
group is the ATC C, that includes the medicines that act in the cardiovascular system, since it
is the group that represents the highest portion of all the medicines sold in Portugal, in units, as
seen in Figure 3. Therefore, the coefficients on each dummy variable supports the hypothesis
that the generic consumption is higher when we consider some ATC groups, such as group L, A
and B, that include antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents, medicines for the alimentary
tract and metabolism and for the blood and blood forming organs, respectively. On the other
hand, the medicines included in groups S and R are the ones with a lower share of generics,
which include medicines for the sensory organs and respiratory system, respectively. Crossing
these coefficients with the descriptive statistics table presented before (see Figure 3 again),
it is also possible to conclude that the medicines that have less sales are not necessarily the
ones with the lowest generic sales, since the ones belonging to group L (antineoplastic and
immunomodulating agents) are some with the highest share in terms of generic products but
they are also the second group with lower sales in total. On the opposite side, the drugs included
in group R, for instance, form the fourth group with more sales in the market, but this is one of
the groups with lower share of generic products sold.
4.4 Including price differences
With the previous regression it was possible to have a wider perspective of the generics share
inside each homogeneous group. However, the difference in the price paid by consumers when
buying a generic or a non-generic drug is not being taken into consideration, but it may differ
from one homogeneous group to others. Furthermore, previous researchers considered the price
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difference in their studies and found that it is a significant variable, with larger differences in
price of both types of drugs leading to a higher consumption of generic medicines (see Aronsson
et al., 2001 and Carrera and Villas-Boas, 2015). In order to control for the cases where the
difference between buying a branded product is much more expensive than buying a generic
one, a new variable should be introduced. The point is that, since we are aggregating all the
generic and non-generic products of the respective homogeneous group, the only price we can
consider is the average price of each kind of medicines (generics or non-generics). Hence, the
variable named pricedif was computed and introduced in the regression, which corresponds to
the difference of the average price of the generic products and the average price of the branded
products for the respective homogeneous group, and a positive coefficient is expected in order
to go along with the literature previously mentioned. Notice that, as in regressions (1) and (2),
the prices considered are only the part actually paid by consumers. Moreover, due to the data
aggregation, it was assumed here that all the sales were made under the general reimbursement
regime as well.3
Hence, the estimated equation is now:





βkDk,g +βXc,t +αZc + εg,c,t (4)
where the vector X represents all the socioeconomic variables that change across time, and
Z represents the variables related to education (assumed as constant over time). Components
remain the same as before.
The obtained results are expressed in the last two columns of Table 6. Notice, however,
that now the number of observations is smaller than in the previous regression without this vari-
able included, as well as the R-squared. Nevertheless, notice that the excluded homogeneous
groups should actually be in the regression but with the values for genericshare being equal to
1 or 0, depending on the situation of only generic medicines or only branded products having
been sold, and that is the reason why they were not excluded when equation (3) was run.
The coefficients found were similar to the ones obtained in the previous regression, but
now we can confirm that the difference in the prices of generic and non-generic drugs is statis-
tically significant, and the higher this difference is, the higher the generics share will be. It goes
along with the expected result (see Aronsson et al., 2001 and Carrera and Villas-Boas, 2015).
3See the following section for an equivalent analysis that considers all the sales covered by the special reim-
bursement regime.
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5 Assuming the special reimbursement regime for all drug
sales
As it was already mentioned, due to the aggregation of data it was not possible to identify
which and how many drug sales were covered by the general and the special reimbursement
regimes. All the previous analyses were made assuming that every sale was covered by the
general regime, since it was the one applied in more than 60% of the total sales of medicines
in Portugal (see Table 9 in the Appendix). However, the special regime is applied to medicines
used in diseases specified in government ordinances, but also when patients have a low income.
Since this last aspect may interfere specifically with some socioeconomic factors considered
in the analysis previously presented, regressions (1), (2) and (4) were run once again but now
considering that all sales were made under the special reimbursement regime. This difference
has only an impact in the variables outpocketuni and pricedif, since the percentage applied to
the reference price of each medicine is now higher. Therefore, since equation (3) does not take
prices into consideration, it has no impact at all and is not considered in this section.
See Table 10 in the Appendix for the results obtained by running regressions (1) and (2).
The coefficients obtained for equation (1) are very similar to the ones obtained previously.
However, the variable oldpeople is now statistically significant, meaning that it seems to explain
the individual market shares of the medicines sold. Nevertheless, its associated coefficient has a
negative sign, just like the one associated with the variable youngpeople. Consequently, it seems
that aging does not change that much consumers’ preferences for diversify. Under this regime,
the variable highsch seems to be non-statistically significant as previously, but income does not
seem to explain the dependent variable. Note that the coefficients associated with the crucial
variables that account for the entrance of new medicines in the homogeneous group continue to
show similar results as previously, so no significant differences are found due to the changes in
the considered reimbursement regime.
Similarly, the results obtained from regression (2) are even more similar to the ones
obtained previously (see Section 4.2). The only difference is that now the cross variables
newgen× generic seem to be non-statistically significant, which means that there is no sig-
nificant difference in the effect of the introduction of one more generic drug in the shares of
generic versus brand-name medicines: the shares of both kinds of medicines are expected to
decrease by, on average, 0.0036 p.p., ceteris paribus.
At last, Table 11 in the Appendix shows the results obtained with regression (4). Actually,
the coefficients obtained have not only the same sign but are also very close in value to the ones
obtained when the general regime was assumed. Hence, the analysis presented before seems to
be valid.
However, it is worth mentioning that the R-squared values of these regressions assuming
the special regime are slightly lower than the ones obtained previously.
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6 Robustness
All the econometric regressions presented above were performed using the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) method. Actually, it is one of the most standard estimation methods used world-
wide in a great variety of studies and different situations. The reason why it was used also here
in this analysis was due to its great generality and adaptability, but one may argue that this is
not perfectly appropriate for the analyzed data.
In fact, both equations (1) and (2) have the variable drugshare as the dependent variable,
which has a very big quantity of null observations. Actually, its mean is 0.0558 and up to
percentile 50 it only takes the value zero. In the same way, the equations (3) and (4) that
includes genericshare as their dependent variable also have a similar problem, but in that case
with a great number of observations taking the value zero and one.
Because of that, a censored or truncated model that takes into account the great number
of zero values such as the Tobit model was also taken into consideration when choosing the best
model. However, these null values in the data are not censored in any sense, since they are equal
to 0 only because the medicine m was actually not sold in that county c and period t. Therefore,
it is not the case of censoring the data in order to transform into zero all the values below that
or other similar censoring mechanism. The data is what it is, and nothing is being changed. For
that reason, it was concluded that the Tobit model is not really appropriate for this database.
Nevertheless, the analysis was also made using the Tobit model. The obtained results can be
found in the Appendix (Tables 12 and 13), but they are very similar to the ones obtained with
the OLS model and presented above. The only differences found are related to the variables
newbrand in equations (1) and (2): when a new branded product is introduced, according to the
Tobit estimations, it is expected that the share of generic drugs decreases. Notice that the OLS
model concluded the opposite, but it must be taken into consideration that it is very uncommon
to have new branded drugs entering the market as substitutes of another brand-name medicine
already established. Therefore, this result does not seem very relevant.
In addition to the previous approach, the zero inflated negative binomial method was
also considered. This model also allows for a great number of zero values in the observations,
but in fact it should be used with count data. Notice, however, that both dependent variables
considered are market shares, computed taking into account the units purchased, and therefore
they are not count data. Therefore, it does not make sense to apply this estimation data in our
analysis.
Consequently, the OLS method seems the best model to fit the data.
7 Conclusion
The main purpose of this dissertation is to understand the consumers’ preferences over generic
drugs by looking at the revealed choices of those products by individuals through sales and
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how the demand of those goods relatively to the brand ones are affected when new generic
drugs are introduced in the market. It is expected that those consumer’s preferences depend on
socioeconomic conditions or at least that the decisions to buy a given type of medicine derive
from given preferences and interact with the consumer’s economic conditions. Because of that,
it is checked how several socioeconomic indicators can explain either the relative demand of
new generics as well as the evolution of that demand with time.
The main results indicate that, depending on these socioeconomic factors, some counties
tend to diverse more than others the various medicines purchased, i.e. the market shares of
each individual drug are lower in some regions than in others. Moreover, if one new generic
drug is introduced in the market, a decrease can be seen in the individual market share of not
only the equivalent generics but also of the individual share of the branded equivalent products,
which goes along with the results found by Grabowski and Vernon (1992). As time goes on, it
is possible to see that the individual shares of generic products have been increasing, opposed
to the ones of brand-name drugs, as it was forecasted by Barros et al. (2015).
Furthermore, this study also allows us to conclude that counties with lower income and
higher unemployment tend to buy more generic drugs, similarly to the results obtained by Dylst
et al. (2013) and Vallès et al. (2003). Nevertheless, the fact that a higher education level leads
to a lower percentage of generic drugs purchased goes against the previous literature. Note yet
that this may be the consequence of the aggregated data used in this study, that may have caused
a high correlation between income and education, as previously argued. Despite Himmel et al.
(2005) and Heikkilä et al. (2007) arguing the opposite, the data used in this study shows that
there are no significant differences on the preferences for generic drugs in people of different
ages, similarly to the results obtained by Figueiras et al. (2008) for Portugal.
It was concluded that the homogeneous groups with more generic drugs available are the
ones which have a higher proportion of generic sales as well. Besides that, when introducing
the same proportion of generic and non-generic drugs in a homogeneous group, in a way that
the proportion of generics in the group does not change, the brand-name medicines capture
immediately a higher market share than the generic ones. Finally, the last result goes with the
conclusion of Aronsson et al (2001) and Carrera and Villas-Boas, (2015) since the larger the
price difference between branded products and generics, the higher will be the share of all the
equivalent generics. Also notice that these authors observed this considering the shares in value,
while this dissertation observed it with respect to the number of units sold.
Notwithstanding, the analysis presented in this thesis has some limitations. The first
and the most important one is the fact that the used database had aggregated data into counties.
Consequently, it was not possible to characterize each individual consumer and it was needed to
work with the average of the socioeconomic variables for each municipality, which prevented us
to study the individual preferences. Moreover, this limitation made it impossible to separate the
sales covered by the general and special reimbursement regimes. Hence, the analysis was firstly
done considering only the general regime for all sales and, in Section 5, only the special regime
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was considered. However, it was possible to conclude that there are no significant differences
between the two rules.
As a future work, it would be interesting to collect a database with individual data in order
to try to solve the limitations previously mentioned. Moreover, it would also be interesting to do
the same analysis but considering medicines that are used only to treat chronic and non-chronic
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Appendix
List of the counties’ groups
Table 7: Groups of Counties
Group Counties
1 Abrantes, Albergaria-a-Velha, Albufeira, Alcochete, Alenquer, Almeirim, Amares, Anadia,
Angra do Heroísmo, Arcos de Valdevez, Arouca, Azambuja, Baião, Beja, Benavente, Bragança,
Câmara de Lobos, Cantanhede, Cartaxo, Celorico de Basto, Chaves, Cinfães, Coruche, Elvas,
Entroncamento, Espinho, Esposende, Estarreja, Fundão, Guarda, Ílhavo, Lagoa, Lagos, Lamego,
Lourinhã, Machico, Mangualde, Marinha Grande, Mealhada, Mirandela, Monção,
Montemor-o-Velho, Odemira, Olhão, Oliveira do Bairro, Oliveira do Hospital, Ourém, Peniche,
Ponte de Lima, Portalegre, Porto de Mós, Póvoa de Lanhoso, Ribeira Grande, Rio Maior,
Salvaterra de Magos, Santa Cruz, Santiago do Cacém, São João da Madeira, Seia, Silves, Soure,
Tavira, Tomar, Tondela, Torres Novas, Trofa, Vagos, Vale de Cambra, Vila da Praia da Vitória,
Vila Real de Santo António, Vizela
2 Lisboa, Sintra, Vila Nova de Gaia
3 Águeda, Alcobaça, Amarante, Aveiro, Barreiro, Caldas da Rainha, Castelo Branco, Covilhã,
Évora, Fafe, Faro, Felgueiras, Figueira da Foz, Funchal, Loulé, Lousada, Mafra, Marco de
Canaveses, Moita, Montijo, Oliveira de Azeméis, Ovar, Paços de Ferreira, Palmela, Paredes,
Penafiel, Pombal, Ponta Delgada, Portimão, Póvoa de Varzim, Santarém, Santo Tirso, Sesimbra,
Torres Vedras, Valongo, Viana do Castelo, Vila do Conde, Vila Real, Vila Verde, Viseu
4 Almada, Amadora, Barcelos, Braga, Cascais, Coimbra, Gondomar, Guimarães, Leiria, Loures,
Maia, Matosinhos, Odivelas, Oeiras, Porto, Santa Maria da Feira, Seixal, Setúbal, Vila Franca de
Xira, Vila Nova de Famalicão,
5 Aguiar da Beira, Alandroal, Alcácer do Sal, Alcanena, Alcoutim, Alfândega da Fé, Alijó, Aljezur,
Aljustrel, Almeida, Almodôvar, Alpiarça, Alter do Chão, Alvaiázere, Alvito, Ansião, Arganil,
Armamar, Arraiolos, Arronches, Arruda dos Vinhos, Avis, Barrancos, Batalha, Belmonte,
Bombarral, Borba, Boticas, Cabeceiras de Basto, Cadaval, Calheta (RAA), Calheta (RAM),
Caminha, Campo Maior, Carrazeda de Ansiães, Carregal do Sal, Castanheira de Pêra, Castelo de
Paiva, Castelo de Vide, Castro Daire, Castro Marim, Castro Verde, Celorico da Beira, Chamusca,
Condeixa-a-Nova, Constância, Corvo, Crato, Cuba, Estremoz, Ferreira do Alentejo, Ferreira do
Zêzere, Figueira de Castelo Rodrigo, Figueiró dos Vinhos, Fornos de Algodres, Freixo de Espada
À Cinta, Fronteira, Gavião, Góis, Golegã, Gouveia, Grândola, Horta, Idanha-a-Nova, Lagoa
(RAA), Lajes das Flores, Lajes do Pico, Lousã, Mação, Macedo de Cavaleiros, Madalena,
Manteigas, Marvão, Meda, Melgaço, Mértola, Mesão Frio, Mira, Miranda do Corvo, Miranda do
Douro, Mogadouro, Moimenta da Beira, Monchique, Mondim de Basto, Monforte, Montalegre,
Montemor-o-Novo, Mora, Mortágua, Moura, Mourão, Murça, Murtosa, Nazaré, Nelas, Nisa,
Nordeste, Óbidos, Oleiros, Oliveira de Frades, Ourique, Pampilhosa da Serra, Paredes de Coura,
Pedrógão Grande, Penacova, Penalva do Castelo, Penamacor, Penedono, Penela, Peso da Régua,
Pinhel, Ponta do Sol, Ponte da Barca, Ponte de Sor, Portel, Porto Moniz, Porto Santo, Povoação,
Proença-a-Nova, Redondo, Reguengos de Monsaraz, Resende, Ribeira Brava, Ribeira de Pena,
Sabrosa, Sabugal, Santa Comba Dão, Santa Cruz da Graciosa, Santa Cruz das Flores, Santa Marta
de Penaguião, Santana, São Brás de Alportel, São João da Pesqueira, São Pedro do Sul, São
Roque do Pico, São Vicente, Sardoal, Sátão, Sernancelhe, Serpa, Sertã, Sever do Vouga, Sines,
Sobral de Monte Agraço, Sousel, Tábua, Tabuaço, Tarouca, Terras de Bouro, Torre de Moncorvo,
Trancoso, Valença, Valpaços, Velas, Vendas Novas, Viana do Alentejo, Vidigueira, Vieira do
Minho, Vila de Rei, Vila do Bispo, Vila do Porto, Vila Flor, Vila Franca do Campo, Vila Nova da
Barquinha, Vila Nova de Cerveira, Vila Nova de Foz Côa, Vila Nova de Paiva, Vila Nova de
Poiares, Vila Pouca de Aguiar, Vila Velha de Ródão, Vila Viçosa, Vimioso, Vinhais, Vouzela
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Description of the ATC code (first level)
Table 8: ATC code (first level)
ATC - first level Description
A Alimentary tract and metabolism
B Blood and blood forming organs
C Cardiovascular system
D Dermatologicals
G Genito-urinary system and sex hormones
H Systemic hormonal preparations, excluding sex hormones and insulins
J Antiinfectives for systemic use
L Antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents
M Musculo-skeletal system
N Nervous system





Table 9: Sales covered by the general reimbursement regime (total market)
Year Percentage of sales covered






Source: Information system hmR / SICMED - CEFAR Analysis
Notes: This Table shows the percentage of medicine sales in Portugal covered by the general reimbursement
regime. The remaining portion stands for the special regime.
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Table 10: Outputs from equations (1) and (2), assuming the special reimbursement regime for
all sales
Dependent variable: drugshare (1) (2)
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
generic −0.2291 0.000 −0.2624 0.000
log(out pocketuni) −0.0064 0.000 −0.0064 0.000
newgen −0.0023 0.000 −0.0036 0.187
newbrand −0.1676 0.000 −0.1762 0.000
newgen×generic −0.0025 0.000 −0.0002 0.000
newbrand ×generic 0.1735 0.000 0.1850 0.000
youngpeople −0.0117 0.043 0.0342 0.000
old people −0.0098 0.012 0.0026 0.507
pharmpc −2.8069 0.000 −2.4639 0.000
minincome −0.0270 0.000 −0.0455 0.000
unemp 0.0151 0.000 0.0493 0.000
density 6.24e−7 0.000 4.73e−7 0.000
income −8.26e−7 0.338 −3.98e−6 0.000
noeduc −0.0148 0.000 −0.0096 0.003
highsch 0.0057 0.127 0.0009 0.800
acdegree 0.0277 0.000 0.0380 0.000
relativeage −0.0065 0.000
relativeage×generic 0.0109 0.000
constant 0.2603 0.000 0.2645 0.000
Number of observations 9,620,593 9,620,593
R-squared 0.1613 0.1621
Notes: The Table shows the obtained coefficients and p-values for regressions (1) and (2), run using the OLS
estimators and assuming the special reimbursement regime for all the sales.
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Table 11: Outputs from equation (4) assuming the special reimbursement regime for all sales

























pricedi f 0.0200 0.000
constant 0.0065 0.568
Number of observations 717,032
R-squared 0.3362
Notes: The Table shows the obtained coefficients and p-values for regression (4), run using the OLS estimators
and assuming the special reimbursement regime for all the sales.
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Tobit outputs
Table 12: Marginal effects from equations (1) and (2) using the Tobit model
Dependent variable: drugshare (1) (2)
marginal effect p-value marginal effect p-value
generic −0.3749 0.000 −0.3889 0.000
log(out pocketuni) −0.0131 0.000 −0.0131 0.000
newgen 0.0005 0.047 −0.0009 0.001
newbrand −0.3043 0.000 −0.3139 0.000
newgen×generic −0.0169 0.000 −0.0163 0.000
newbrand ×generic 0.2770 0.000 0.2846 0.000
youngpeople 0.0112 0.337 −0.0602 0.000
old people −0.1484 0.000 −0.1659 0.000
pharmpc −26.8802 0.000 −27.5104 0.000
minincome −0.6112 0.000 −0.5800 0.000
unemp 0.5504 0.000 0.4916 0.000
density 9.31e−6 0.000 9.53e−6 0.000
income −3.14e−5 0.000 −2.69e−5 0.000
noeduc −0.2156 0.000 −0.2265 0.000
highsch 0.0351 0.000 0.0406 0.000
acdegree 0.5208 0.000 0.5048 0.000
relativeage −0.0080 0.000
relativeage×generic 0.0046 0.000
Number of observations 9,620,593 9,620,593
Log-likelihood −4,525,771.8 −4,524,799.5
Notes: The Table shows the marginal effects and p-values for regressions (1) and (2), run using the Tobit model
and assuming the general reimbursement regime for all the sales.
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Table 13: Marginal effects from equations (3) and (4) using the Tobit model
Dependent variable: genericshare (3) (4)
marginal effect p-value marginal effect p-value
genericprop 1.3082 0.000 1.0124 0.000
newgen −0,0401 0.000 −0.0387 0.000
youngpeople −0.1623 0.000 −0.2089 0.000
old people −0.1180 0.000 −0.1444 0.000
pharmpc −13.6149 0.000 −14.2330 0.000
minincome −0.2410 0.000 −0.2497 0.000
unemp 0.3712 0.000 0.4151 0.000
density 4.68e−6 0.000 5.28e−6 0.000
income −1.38e−5 0.002 −1.54e−5 0.003
noeduc −0.0399 0.019 −0.0343 0.082
highsch 0.0347 0.071 0.0363 0.107
acdegree −0.0239 0.099 −0.0550 0.001
A 0.0320 0.000 0.0316 0.000
B 0.0191 0.000 0.0491 0.000
D −0.0110 0.000 −0.1051 0.000
G −0.0676 0.000 −0.1810 0.000
H −0.1273 0.000 −0.1699 0.000
J −0.0034 0.009 −0.0364 0.000
L 0.1256 0.000 0.1525 0.000
M 0.0160 0.000 −0.0168 0.000
N −0.0016 0.093 −0.0126 0.000
R −0.1174 0.000 −0.1695 0.000
S −0.3492 0.000 −0.6033 0.000
pricedi f 0.0213 0.000
Number of observations 933,919 717,032
Log-likelihood −316,160.02 −302,487.27
Notes: The Table shows the marginal effects and p-values for regressions (3) and (4), using the Tobit model and
assuming the general reimbursement regime for all the sales.
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